Title: Solving Cournot Game Model as a Centralized Optimization Problem: Designing Subsidy and Tax for a Carbon Market

Speaker: Amir Fayaz Heidari

Summary:
The operation costs of renewable energy resources such as wind and solar generations are cheaper than conventional generators like coal-fired power plants which motivates investing in these cost-effective technologies. Furthermore, the operation of conventional generators leads to environmental concerns due to their high carbon emission. One of the policy-based strategies causing faster displacement of the conventional generators and faster penetration of renewables is to impose a carbon tax on the conventional generators, and also to subsidize the renewables as they are carbon-emission-free resources. Since a power system has multiple technology owners, and also the dispatch level of each generator is determined by the electricity market settlement, a game model is needed to design the tax and subsidy for the carbon market. However, individually solving the objective function of all market players is super complex. In this respect, we propose a centralized objective function that has exactly the same Nash Equilibrium point as the competitive game model. Indeed, we demonstrate that solving all objective functions of each individual market player together is precisely equivalent to solving the presented centralized objective function because the optimization objective function over the convex constraint sets is convex.

Biography:
Amir Fayaz Heidari is a PhD student at The University of Melbourne. His project is on the impact of distributed energy resources on electricity markets and is fully funded by the Melbourne Research Scholarship. Amir is currently working remotely for the Economic Regulation Authority, Perth, Australia, as an energy market analyst. He received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from The University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran, in 2015, and an M.S. degree in power systems engineering from the Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, in 2017. His research interests concentrate on energy market analysis, power system planning, frequency control ancillary services, and optimization and game theory in developing energy sector policies.

MEETING ID: 873 1557 5255; PASSWORD: 778635

WED 30 OCTOBER 2024 16:00-17:00 (AEST, Melbourne Time)